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THREE’S A CROWD: A LOOK AT
POTENTIAL TROUBLES CREATED BY
THIRD-PARTY STANDING WHEN BRINGING
A TITLE IX CLAIM
TAYLOR A. WILSON
I. INTRODUCTION
When now legendary football coach Hayden Fry first stepped into the head
coaching job at the University of Iowa, clad in white pants and sunglasses, one
of his first orders of business was redecorating Kinnick Stadium.1 With an undergraduate degree in psychology, Coach Fry decided to put his schooling to
use by getting inside the heads of the opponents his team—the Hawkeyes—
would take on.2 He did so by painting the walls, installing new carpets, and
even replacing the ill-used urinals of the visitor locker room. 3 This would all
seem standard, except that Coach Fry’s redecorating had a theme—everything
new in the visitor locker room was pink.4
Depending on the source, Coach Fry’s use of pink is said to have been a
tactic meant to have a calming effect on visiting opponents or a ploy to create a
connotation that they were “sissies.”5 Either way, Coach Fry believes the pink
walls served their purpose, stating in his autobiography, “[i]t’s been fun to get
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in law school. Lastly, the Author would like to extend additional gratitude to her father, Matt, who took
her to her first Hawkeye football game while Coach Fry was still roaming the sidelines of Kinnick
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1. See Fred Bierman, Iowa Keeps Opponents Thinking Pink, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:38 PM),
http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/iowa-keeps-opponents-thinking-pink/?_r=1;
Travis
Haney, Oklahoma Football: Hayden Fry’s Legacy Goes Beyond a Coaching Tree Featuring Bob
Stoops, Kirk Ferentz, NEWS OK (Dec. 23, 2011), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-football-hayden-fryslegacy-goes-beyond-a-coaching-tree-featuring-bob-stoops-kirk-ferentz/article/3634632/?page=2.
2. Bierman, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Peter Richmond, Not So Pretty in Pink, SPORTSONEARTH (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/63315532/.
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the reaction of visiting coaches. . . . When I talk to an opposing coach before
the game and he mentions the pink walls, I know I’ve got him. I can’t recall a
coach who has stirred up a fuss about the color and then beaten us.”6 Perhaps
the most notable reaction to the locker rooms came from the University of Michigan’s head coach, Bo Schembechler, who hated the color palette enough to order his coaching assistants to cover the walls with white paper before his team
entered the facility.7
Coach Fry retired in 1999, but the all-pink visitor locker room at Kinnick
Stadium remains.8 Furthermore, the University of Iowa is no longer home to
the only athletics team implementing, or attempting to implement, the pinking
ploy.9 Until December 2010, the University of Minnesota-Duluth Bulldogs
hockey team played its home games at the Duluth Entertainment and Convention Center (DECC), which housed a similarly hued visitor’s facility.10 However, when plans to repeat the color scheme at the new AMSOIL Arena were
put forth, they were met with resistance from an outside source.11 Similarly,
after a family from Bondurant, Iowa offered to donate $3 million to the local
high school athletic department in order to build a brand new, pink visitor’s
locker room, the school board received some unsolicited outside counsel advising against the move.12
Today, headlines created by pink locker rooms tend not to be based upon
the reactions of opposing players and coaches, but instead upon the potential
legal issues created by the seemingly feminine motif. When plans to renovate
Kinnick Stadium were announced in 2005, the University of Iowa made it clear
that it intended to honor Coach Fry’s legacy by maintaining the pink visitor
locker room.13 Erin Buzuvis, a then-visiting professor at the University of Iowa
College of Law, attended a public forum meant to address any concerns with
the renovation.14 It was here that she expressed her opinion that maintaining the
pink locker room created a potential Title IX issue and that “in light of the cultural association of pink with girls and sissies . . . the locker room symbolism
6. HAYDEN FRY & GEORGE WINE, HAYDEN FRY: A HIGH PORCH PICNIC 102–03 (1999).
7. Sally Jenkins, Tickled Pink by Iowa’s Locker Room, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/30/AR2005093001975.html.
8. Haney, supra note 1.
9. See Richmond, supra note 5.
10. Justin Magill, Closing the DECC, COLLEGE HOCKEY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.collegehockeynews.com/news/2010/12/03_closing_the_decc.php.
11. See id.
12. See Richmond, supra note 5.
13. Erin E. Buzuvis, Reading the Pink Locker Room: On Football Culture and Title IX, 14 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2 (2007).
14. Id. at 4.
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could be perceived as a university-sponsored insult that trades in sexism and
homophobia.”15
Professor Buzuvis’ opinions quickly became public, and the overall response from University officials, the press, and local citizens was less than receptive.16 However, she did find some support in her fellow legal professionals.
Jill Gaulding, a colleague of Buzuvis at the College of Law and co-founder of
Gender Justice, began to “[lead] protests against the pink locker room tradition.”17 It is Gender Justice that successfully stepped in and dissuaded the University of Minnesota-Duluth and Bondurant High School from continuing the
trend of “pink shaming” or else risk potential legal action.18 While the potential
Title IX issues Professors Buzuvis and Gaulding promote are intriguing—and
most certainly have caught the eye of the media—what might sooner stand out
to legal scholars is whether an organization such as Gender Justice has the ability to bring such a claim in court.
Traditionally, gender discrimination claims falling under the scope of Title
IX are brought by the person or persons who feel a direct adverse effect as a
result of a school’s non-compliance with the law.19 More recently, outside interest groups have attempted to bring third-party claims against academic institutions with varying levels of success.20 A look at recent case law reveals that
a circuit split currently exists as to third-party standing in such instances.21
This Comment will analyze the ability of a third party to bring a Title IX
claim against an academic institution. Part II will provide an overview of the
history of Title IX claims in the United States. Part III will analyze the legal
concept of standing and how courts currently differ with regards to certain types
of third-party claims. Finally, Part IV will advocate for one side of the current
circuit split and predict the ability of a third party to bring a claim under that
analysis against a school such as the University of Iowa for allowing the continuance of pink locker rooms, something Professor Buzuvis postulates “w[ill]
denigrate female athletes, and thus suppress the extent to which women would
report an interest in athletics.”22
15. Id.
16. Id. at 5.
17. About Us, GENDER JUSTICE, http://genderjustice.us/about/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).
18. Richmond, supra note 5.
19. See generally U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S COMMISSION FOR OPPORTUNITY IN
ATHLETICS, “OPEN TO ALL”: TITLE IX AT THIRTY
(2003),
available
at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf [hereinafter TITLE IX AT THIRTY].
20. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); Am. Sports
Council v. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012).
21. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d 91; Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288.
22. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 47.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX CLAIMS
In the early 1970s, Congress made the important decision to enact legislation to help eliminate sex discrimination in education.23 On June 23, 1972, President Nixon signed 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX) into law.24 The statute states
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”25 Due to the broad language of the statute, Title IX casts a broad net,
affecting a wide range of people and programs within the education system.
A. Title IX As a Tool for Maintaining Gender Equity in Athletics
While Title IX does not directly mention the elimination of discrimination
within athletics, statistics on sports participation prior to Title IX’s enactment
made it clear that the statute had the potential to have a drastic effect on sports
at the interscholastic and collegiate levels. According to research done by the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) from 1967–1968, there were
roughly 152,000 male athletes and 15,000 female athletes participating in intercollegiate athletics at that time.26 A similar study done at the high school level
in 1971 reported that 3.7 million boys and just 294,000 girls competed in
school-sponsored sports that year.27 By 1975, the United States Department of
Education (DOE) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) approved a regulation pursuant
to statute, directly applying Title IX to school athletics.28 The regulation reads,
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in
any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics
offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such
athletics separately on such basis.29

23. Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad is Not Good: Allowing Title IX “Compliance” by the Elimination of Men’s Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 253, 253 (2001).
24. See generally Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 44.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
26. TITLE IX AT THIRTY, supra note 19, at 13.
27. Id.
28. Shelton, supra note 23, at 253.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (2014).
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Due to the traditional male-domination in sports, athletic departments nationwide fight an on-going battle to maintain equity within their programs.30 After
the implementation of Title IX, this fact quickly became evident.
By summer 1978, the DOE received somewhere close to 100 complaints
alleging Title IX violations at over fifty institutions of higher education.31 For
this reason, the OCR adopted a policy interpretation meant to clarify the ways
in which a school may stay in compliance with the regulation.32 Per the interpretation, a plaintiff can bring a successful athletic-based Title IX claim against
an educational institution by showing that an educational institution has failed
to maintain compliance in financial assistance, other program areas, or in meeting the interests and abilities of students of both genders.33 The majority of Title
IX publicity stems from the third part of the policy interpretation, which provides what has come to be known as the “three-prong test.”34 If an institution
can show substantial proportionality of students, history and continuing practice
of expanding opportunities, or accommodation of the interests of the underrepresented sex, then it will be deemed Title IX compliant.35

30. See generally TITLE IX AT THIRTY, supra note 19.
31. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (Dec. 11, 1979), available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html
[hereinafter
1979
POLICY
INTERPRETATION].
32. See id.
33. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty Legal
Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 336–40 (2012) [hereinafter Title IX at Forty].
34. Id. at 339–40. See also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at § VII(C)(5)(a). Specifically, the three-prong test states,
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the
members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.

Id.
35. See 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 31.
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Generally, the biggest issue for colleges and universities attempting to remain compliant with the three-prong test is maintaining proportionality.36 Under this prong, the percentage of male and female student-athletes should be
proportionate to the percentage of males and females attending the college or
university.37 This issue has become prominent due to the fact that it frequently
leads to schools cutting men’s athletic teams in order to reach substantial proportionality.38 If the institution cannot prove that it has met one of the three
prongs, “[a]lthough the statute itself provides for no remedies beyond the termination of federal funding, the Supreme Court has determined that Title IX is
enforceable through an implied private right of action, and that damages are
available for an action brought under Title IX.”39 While issues arising from a
lack of equity among student-athletes seem to dominate the public’s discourse
regarding Title IX, such issues are far from the full scope of claims brought
under the statute.
B. Title IX As a Tool for Eliminating Sex-Based Discrimination More
Generally
Since the implementation of Title IX and subsequent regulations, educational institutions receiving government financial aid have been tasked with ensuring a prohibition of sex-based discrimination in their buildings and on their
campuses.40 Beyond mandating equal opportunity in athletics, courts have also
found that Title IX extends to the prohibition of sex-based employment discrimination41 and sexual harassment.42
When it comes to employment discrimination, one study found that over
Title IX’s first thirty-five years as law, 19% of the litigation studied focused on
employment discrimination claims.43 In North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell, the Supreme Court held that the legislative history and statutory language
of Title IX supported the conclusion that the law prohibits employment discrimination.44 Further, the Court found that it was within the Department of Health,
36. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based
Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731
(2003).
37. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 177 (1st Cir. 1996).
38. See generally id.
39. Id. at 167.
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
41. See generally N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
42. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
43. Paul Anderson & Barbara Osborne, Report: A Historical Review of Title IX Litigation, 18 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 127, 136 (2008).
44. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 530.
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Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) authority to implement regulations, such as
revoking a school’s federal funding, to combat unfair employment policies.45
Ultimately, the North Haven case made it apparent that an individual bringing
a discrimination claim against an educational program could utilize Title IX.46
The use of Title IX to eliminate sexual harassment in schools has also become commonplace. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, a high
school student brought a claim against her teacher and coach for his repeated
sexual harassment.47 In this instance, the school had been notified of the issue
and failed to take any action to end it, going so far as to discourage the student
from pressing charges.48 Eventually, Franklin brought a claim that sought damages from the school for permitting the harassment to continue.49 The case made
its way through the courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that “Congress had not limited the remedies available under Title IX,” permitting damages to be sought in the enforcement of the law going forward.50 This decision
provided potential claimants a new form of relief, as well incentive to take action against sexual harassment occurring in schools.51
By the mid-1990s, it became commonplace for courts to review claims of
sexual harassment committed by teachers, coaches, and fellow students.52 In
1997, the OCR published its first guidance to help clarify the application of Title
IX to sexual harassment, which stated that schools are required to have policies
and procedures that afford fast and fair resolutions to sexual harassment claims
by students.53 Further, it became clear that schools would be held accountable
“for instances of quid pro quo sexual harassment[,] and may also be liable for
hostile environment sexual harassment if the coach or other employee uses their
apparent authority when they engage in harassing conduct.”54 Additionally,
schools can be held liable for sexual harassment between students (i.e.,
peer-to-peer) if they permit a hostile environment to continue because they
knew or should have known the harassment was occurring and failed to take
quick and proper measures to eliminate the issue.55 As a result of the OCR’s

45. Id. at 537–39.
46. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 342.
47. 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992).
48. Id. at 63–64.
49. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990).
50. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 346.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 356.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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guidance and subsequent cases,56 notice has been given to schools regarding
their potential liability for harassing conduct by their staff or students.57 Because of this, schools must be sure to implement adequate procedures to avoid
liability.
C. Asserting a Title IX Claim
Prior to 2009, a question existed as to a complainant’s ability to simultaneously bring Title IX and constitutional claims.58 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable
School Committee brought this issue before the Supreme Court, when parents
of a harassed grade school student cited Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause
in their claim against the school.59 Initially, the Supreme Court analyzed prior
decisions involving the assertion of claims under the Constitution and federal
statutes, finding that “in determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the
enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, [they] have placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute’s remedial scheme.”60 The Court
determined that it had precluded the use of both the Constitution and federal
statute in instances where the statute mandated that claimants exhaust certain
administrative remedies or follow a particular procedure.61
In the case of Title IX, the only enforcement mechanism written into the
statute is the potential for withdrawal of federal funding.62 The Court found that
this, coupled with the previously held implied right of action,63 amount to a
much lesser enforcement scheme than those typically found.64 Further, the
Court concluded that the actual rights provided for by the Equal Protection
Clause and Title IX are quite different, vesting “divergent coverage.”65 As such,
the Court determined that “Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism
for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for § 1983 suits
as a means of enforcing constitutional rights” and “suits based on the Equal
Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender

56. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebster v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
57. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 361.
58. See id. at 382.
59. 555 U.S. 246, 246 (2009).
60. Id. at 253.
61. Id. at 254.
62. Id. at 255.
63. See generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
64. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255.
65. Id. at 257–58.
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discrimination in schools.”66
Traditionally, Title IX gender discrimination claims are asserted by the person or persons who feel a direct adverse effect as a result of a school’s non-compliance.67 When issues do arise with Title IX compliance, it is commonplace to
see individual employees, students, or student-athletes or members of an affected team bring suit against the responsible institution.68 Less common, and
decidedly more problematic, is when a third party, someone not directly affected
by the potential breach in Title IX compliance, wishes to bring a claim against
an institution.69 This becomes troublesome due to a plaintiff’s need to establish
standing before he or she can bring a claim in court.
III. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT IN RELATION
TO ORGANIZATION-BASED TITLE IX CLAIMS
In order for a party to have a lawsuit heard in court, the individual or group
must have standing.70 An individual or group may establish third party standing
by showing they have an interest in the issue that is the subject of the claim
being brought.71 It is well established that an association or organization may
bring a third party claim.72 What is less apparent is the requisite interrelation
between an organization and the government action it seeks to prohibit. Currently, a circuit split that exists over the issue is perpetuating this lack of clarity.73
A. Establishing Standing
Before a plaintiff may bring a claim before a court, it must be determined
that the party has proper standing—essentially, the right to be heard.74 Article
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to the types of cases and controversies listed within the

66. Id. at 258.
67. See Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 342–347.
68. See id.
69. See Colton Puckett, American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education: Forty
Years of Title IX and Still Standing (or Not), 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 261 (2013).
70. Hassan v. Iowa, No. 4–11–CV–00574, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, at *3–4 (S.D. Iowa
2012).
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
72. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); City of Duluth
v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Sports Council v. Dep't of Educ.,
850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012).
73. See Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91; cf. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288.
74. Hassan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, at *3–4.
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document.75 The Supreme Court provided an overview to Article III standing
in a recent case when it said an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent[;] fairly traceable to the challenged action[;] and redressable
by a favorable ruling.”76 Further, it has been emphasized that the party or parties
bringing the claim bear the burden of establishing the Article III standing elements.77 Moreover, parties petitioning for federal jurisdiction must, “support
each of the standing requirements with the same kind and degree of evidence at
the successive stages of litigation as any other matter on which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof.”78 Typically, standing is reserved for the parties directly involved in the dispute; however, it is also possible for a third party to
bring a claim.79
B. Standing in a Title IX Claim
As in any claim, when bringing a Title IX claim, the plaintiff—usually a
student, student-athlete, or team—is charged with the task of proving standing
based on a showing of injury, causation, and redressability (Essential Elements
Test).80 In order to satisfy the first requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that an injury is “actual or imminent.”81 What is more, “[a] plaintiff seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury
requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the
future."82 If no further injury might occur, due to graduation or similar reasoning, a court may find a claim to be moot.83 In the case that parents are suing on
behalf of their minor children, the court will determine standing based on the
position of the underage individual, not his or her guardian.84 However, if parents or guardians bring a claim themselves, rather than on behalf of their injured
children, courts are inclined to find them wanting for an injury-in-fact.85 Once
standing has been established, the plaintiff or plaintiffs may prevail by showing
that the academic institution has caused an injury based on its non-compliance
75. See Puckett, supra note 69, at 265.
76. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 140 (2010).
77. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 137
(2014).
78. Constitution Party of S.D. v. Nelson, 639 F.3d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 2011).
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
80. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 285.
84. Id. at 284.
85. See generally Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civ. Rights, No. 05-2439, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39985 (D. Minn. June 14, 2006).
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with the regulations set forth in Title IX.86
C. Establishing Third-Party Standing
Third-party legal standing is not a new concept when it comes to who can
and cannot bring a lawsuit.87 For a third party to be a permissible joinder to a
claim, the individual or group must meet the guidelines detailed in Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 Per the adequacy-based approach that
directs Article III standing within the courts, claimants who can exhibit all parts
of the Essential Elements Test are entitled to invoke the rights of a third party.89
However, current doctrine maintains, as a prudential rule, that claimants generally lack standing to raise the rights of others.90 This presumption against the
permissibility of third-party claims stems from relative standing, “since the person with the greatest stake in asserting a particular right is normally the right
holder herself.”91 To help overcome this presumption, a would-be third party
claimant “must have a close relation to the third party, and there must exist some
hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interest.”92
If the third party or parties can meet this burden, they may be permitted to
have their case heard in court. However, on numerous occasions, the Supreme
Court has made it obvious that “a plaintiff’s standing fails where it is purely
speculative that a requested change . . . will alter the behavior of regulated third
parties that are the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.”93 Further burdening
the standing analysis are the methods for determining associational and organizational standing—the standards for claims that are brought by entities made up

86. Id.
87. See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. On a timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who,
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action,
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
interest.

Id.
89. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1223 (2014).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S 400, 411 (1991).
93. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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of many members.94
D. Associational v. Organizational Third-Party Standing
The terms “associational standing” and “organizational standing” suggest
similar standards and are commonly analyzed together.95 However, it is important to note the differences between the two types of standing for this examination.
1. Association Test
Associational standing may be established when a group—meaning the
overarching entity rather than the members within it—can show that (1) its individual members would have standing on their own; (2) the interests the group
seeks to protect are relevant to its purpose; and (3) the lawsuit does not require
that the individual members bring it (Association Test).96 This standard is permissive and broad in comparison to that of organizational standing, which involves standing for the organization itself, rather than the members or owners
within.97
The case National Wrestling Coaches Association v. Department of Education (NWCA) offers some insight into the requirements for bringing a third-party
Title IX claim as an association.98 In this highly referenced case, the plaintiffs
were the National Wrestling Coaches Association, the Marquette Wrestling
Club, the Committee to Save Bucknell Wrestling, the College Sports Council,
and the Yale Wrestling Association—all membership groups representing the
interests of their respective schools’ wrestling coaches, athletes, and alumni. 99
The claimants centered their case on the assertion that the Three-Part Test implemented by the 1979 Policy Interpretation violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and requires academic institutions to intentionally discriminate in a way that goes directly against the
policy of Title IX.100
In order to be able to bring the claim, the plaintiffs were required to establish
standing by fulfilling the three elements of the Association Test.101 Here, the
94. See Garrett, supra note 77, at 136–40.
95. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); cf. Am. Sports
Council v. Dep’t of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012).
96. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 297–98.
97. See Garrett, supra note 77, at 139.
98. See 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 935.
100. Id. at 936.
101. Id. at 937.
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plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were the result of the decisions of several
federally-funded institutions that opted to eliminate their wrestling programs in
order to maintain Title IX compliance.102 Ultimately, the court held that, despite
showing that an injury-in-fact had occurred, the plaintiffs lacked standing due
to their inability to show that a favorable decision would redress the injury.103
The NWCA court made sure to elaborate on its decision to deny standing,
pointing out that associational standing fails when it is based solely on speculation that a requested change would alter the behavior of a third party that is
directly causing the injury.104 Specifically, the court noted,
[w]hen a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the Government's regulation of a third party that is not before the court, it
becomes “substantially more difficult” to establish standing . . . . Because the necessary elements of causation and redressability in such a case hinge on the independent choices of
the regulated third party, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff
to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be
made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.”105
The Association Test for establishing standing is well-documented and continuously upheld. The statement of the elements in NWCA has been cited and sustained more than a dozen times in the ten years since the decision was handed
down.106 Less consistently decided is the issue of organizational standing.
2. Organization Test
While an association may be granted standing “‘solely as the representative
of its members’ where, inter alia, its members would have standing to sue in
their own right,”107 organizational standing requires the entity to show it “suffered a ‘concrete injury’ to its own interests, apart from any separately identified
102. See id.
103. See id. at 938.
104. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004)..
105. Id. at 938 (citation omitted).
106. See generally City of Duluth v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013);
Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2013); Neighbors of Casino San Pablo v. Salazar,
442 Fed. Appx. 579 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585
(W.D. Tex. 2006).
107. Am. Sports Council v. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Hunt v.
Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977)).
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injury to third parties, such as employees, officers, owners, or shareholders.”108
Further, an organization-plaintiff “must allege that its ‘activities have been impeded[,] not just that its mission has been compromised.’”109 Essentially, an
organization can only establish standing “based on cognizable injury to itself.”110 To summarize these organizational standing principles into one test, it
can be said that an entity must show that it experienced a tangible injury to its
interests as a corporation, which obstructed its ability to carryout its undertakings (Organization Test).
Factually, it is difficult to imagine a Title IX-based situation that would result in the type of concrete harm to an entity that is necessary to successfully
assert the Organization Test. While not the result of a sex discrimination claim,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife provides important language from the Supreme
Court about the requisite proximity of the injury to the organization.111 In Lujan,
the Defenders of Wildlife organization attempted to bring an action challenging
a federal administrative regulation, citing the potential injury to wildlife as a
nexus by which they had standing.112 The Court concluded the nexus theory
was “beyond all reason,” going on to say, “Standing is not ‘an ingenuous academic exercise in the conceivable,’ but as we have said requires . . . a factual
showing of perceptible harm.”113 In order to establish standing under this standard, an organization claiming a Title IX violation needs to show that said violation created a concrete injury to the entity, rather than simply establishing a
close nexus between the harm and the interests the organization seeks to protect.
Nationally, while issues of associational and organizational standing have
seemingly been evenly implemented for years, as of 2012, a circuit split exists
and confusion abounds regarding these types of standing in Title IX cases; this
is due to the cases Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education114 and
American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education.115

108. Garrett, supra note 77, at 139 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).
109. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (citing Abigail Alliance for Better Access v. Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
110. Id. at 299.
111. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1992).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 566 (citing U. S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
114. 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).
115. 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012).

WILSON ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/10/2015 3:00 PM

THIRD-PARTY STANDING IN TI TLE IX CLAIMS

609

E. Associational Standing and the Current Circuit Split
1. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education, originating in the
Fourth Circuit, is the result of a non-profit group suing the DOE and James
Madison University for violations of Title IX.116 These actions stemmed from
James Madison making the decision to cut seven men’s and three women’s athletic teams in order to stay in compliance with the proportionality prong of the
Three-Part Test.117 After learning of James Madison’s intent to disband the
teams, opponents of the decision incorporated Equity in Athletics, Inc. (EIA) in
order to challenge the proposed cuts. 118 EIA promptly filed a motion with the
court for a preliminary injunction in order to prevent James Madison from cutting the teams.119 The defendants, James Madison and the DOE, rebutted this
action by swiftly filing a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial
court.120 The district court reviewed the motion to dismiss de novo.121
Both the DOE and James Madison disputed EIA’s standing to bring the
case, but for varying reasons.122 The DOE contended that the underlying injury
the corporation complained of could only be redressed by the university, and
not through any action on the DOE’s own part.123 James Madison took issue
with the fact that the incorporation did not include any female athletes on existing teams at the university, thus nullifying EIA’s right to dispute scholarship
allocation.124 The court in Equity in Athletics seemingly made quick work of
establishing EIA’s standing to bring a claim, finding that the entity had organizational standing.125 Unfortunately, the aftermath of the decision is not quite so
cut and dry due to the fact that the court actually used the Association Test under
the organizational standing moniker in order to establish standing.126
According to the court in Equity in Athletics, for the EIA to secure organizational standing, the entity must satisfy the three prongs of the Associational

116. See Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91.
117. Id. at 97.
118. Id. at 98.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 98 (4th Cir. 2011).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 99.
126. Id.
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Test.127 Further, in order for the individual members of the organization to fulfill the first of the three Associational Test requirements, and therefore establish
individual standing, the court found that they had to prove the elements of Article III standing, namely that “(1) they suffered an actual or threatened injury
that is concrete, particularized, and not conjectural; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision.”128
In this instance, despite the organizational terminology used, the court actually held that EIA had associational standing to bring claims against the DOE
and James Madison.129 First, the court stated that the individual members had
standing to sue on their own, EIA sought to protect interests directly related to
its purpose, and the suit did not require the participation of individual members,
thus establishing associational standing.130 Second, the court found that EIA’s
members had adequately shown the elements of injury, causation, and redressability as a result of James Madison and the DOE’s actions, resulting in Article
III standing.131 This outcome creates questions as to precedent regarding organizational and associational standing due to the incorrect standard the court used
to establish EIA’s organizational standing. Further, because the case stems from
a factual situation that many courts face, it does not match up with the resulting
holdings in other circuits nationally.
2. American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education
In American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education, decided in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the plaintiff—American
Sports Council (ASC)—is described as a “‘coalition of coaches, athletes, former-athletes, parents, and fans’ organized as a nonprofit.”132 ASC filed its claim
against the DOE seeking, among other things, injunctive relief in order to prevent the DOE’s use of the Three-Part Test at the high school level.133 ASC
purported that the implementation of the test at that level would result in lost
athletic and coaching opportunities for student-athletes and coaches.134 This
127. Id. (stating “(1) that its members would have standing to sue as individuals; (2) that the interests
it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) that the suit does not require the
participation of individual members.”) (citation omitted).
128. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 99 (4th Cir. 2011).
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id. at 99.
131. Id. at 99–100.
132. 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D.D.C. 2012).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 298.
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claim was not ASC’s first against the DOE; the non-profit previously brought
claims that were all dismissed for varying reasons.135 The defendant quickly
moved to have the case dismissed, claiming that ASC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to bring the claim as a result of a lack of standing.136
Arguing against the DOE’s contention that ASC did not have proper standing, the non-profit leaned on both the organizational and associational standing
theories.137 In reference to organizational standing, ASC claimed that the “defendants’ actions caused injury to the organization itself, and that [the] injury is
redressable by a favorable decision from [the] Court.”138 Unlike in Equity in
Athletics, this court correctly stated the Organizational Test. Elaborating on the
organizational standing claim, ASC purported that the DOE’s refusal to retract
the applicability of the Three-Part Test in high schools athletics “frustrates its
organizational mission . . . of ‘preserving and promoting opportunities for students to participate in organized athletics at the collegiate and high school levels.’”139 The court recognized that it is possible for an organization to have
standing based on cognizable injury to the entity; however, it found that this
claim lacked merit due to the absence of causation and redressability.140
Turning its attention to associational standing, the ASC claimed it had
standing to bring the lawsuit “as the representative of ‘coaches, athletes, former-athletes, parents, and fans’ affected by the application of the Three-Part
Test.”141 Looking to the elements of the Association Test, the court found that
ASC had failed to establish that any one of the entities it claimed to represent
would have had standing to bring the claim on its own.142 Additionally, the
court pointed out that it had declined to find associational standing in the Title
135. Id. at 291.
136. Id. at 292.
137. Id. at 297–300.
138. Am. Sports Council v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.D.C. 2012).
139. Id.
140. Id. Elaborating on the issue, the court reasoned,
To claim organizational standing, plaintiff must allege that its “activities have been impeded[,]” not just that its “mission has been compromised.” Thus, the allegation that defendants' actions impede plaintiff's other activities by necessitating diversion of resources
to combat the campaigns of "activist groups" to "apply the Three-Part Test to high school
Athletics" becomes central to plaintiff's claim. There can be no organizational standing
where plaintiff cannot "show 'actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the
alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.'”

Id. (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 297.
142. Id. at 298–99.
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IX context previously, pointing to its decision in NWCA.143
Ultimately, the court found that ASC lacked numerous requisite traits to
bring a claim in the federal court.144 Summarizing its finding, the court stated
in its conclusion that ASC was not to be granted standing simply by virtue of
the fact that it suffered procedural injury as a result of the DOE’s denial of its
original petition.145 The court ensured its opinion would be clear to all when it
further opined,
[t]he claim that activist groups filed complaints “[p]ursuant to
the Department's failure to clarify that the Three-Part Test does
not apply to high school athletics” . . . is no more than “mere
‘unadorned speculation’ as to the existence of a relationship between the challenged government action and the third-party
conduct [and] ‘will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial
power.’”146
Based on this strong wording by the members of the District of Columbia’s
judiciary, there is a divide on the issue of associational standing (termed organizational standing in Equity in Athletics) between it and the judiciary in the
Fourth Circuit. Specifically, the circuits are at odds in regards to the threshold
for showing that a defendant’s actions caused harm or threatened harm to the
members of an organization (i.e. that the harm was traceable).147
IV. PREDICTING THE APPLICATION OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING TO PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS
The contrary holdings in American Sports Council and Equity in Athletics
raise questions as to how courts should address issues of associational standing
with regard to third-party Title IX claims. The proper threshold for proving injury as a result of the challenged conduct in unknown due to the circuit split.148
It is quite possible that the circuits will remain split until such point that the
United States Supreme Court accepts a case dealing with the issue; however,
the Supreme Court accepting such a case is not a guarantee. At first blush, the
outcome of American Sports Council seems to overlook the important detail that
143. Id.
144. Am. Sports Council v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300 (D.D.C. 2012).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 298; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91.
148. See Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 298; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91.
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“‘standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention,’” instead falling into the trap that appears when a claim seems to hold no merit.149
As a result of the holdings in American Sports Council, parties aggrieved
by Title IX or other regulations would be forced to take up the issue with the
courts individually, rather than filing the claim jointly as a non-profit group or
other similarly situated entity. This would potentially eliminate courts being
flooded by fledgling public interest groups looking for any and all opportunities
to have their opinions heard. With our nation’s vastly overcrowded judicial
system, the idea of eliminating somewhat frivolous claims is, admittedly, appealing. However, continuing with such a system seems contrary to citizens’
right to standing as afforded by the United States Constitution and other pertinent regulations. For this reason, the analysis provided in Equity in Athletics
seems a better tool with which to predict future standing issues, as it is more in
keeping with the litany of holdings that came before it.
Under the scope of Equity in Athletics, it seems unlikely that a public interest group such as Gender Justice could bring a successful claim against the University of Iowa or other schools similarly situated based upon associational
standing. As noted in the previous cases, in order to bring a claim on behalf of
its members, Gender Justice would have to show that the individual members
(1) suffered actual or threatened harm; (2) that the harm was traceable to the
challenged conduct; and (3) that the harm is likely to be redressed by a favorable
ruling.150 It appears probable that Gender Justice would face a substantial challenge in trying to prove all three elements.
Seemingly, Gender Justice’s members do not include football players,
coaches, or assistants who have come in contact with the pink locker room at
the University of Iowa or elsewhere. In the cases previously discussed, each
plaintiff was either a non-profit group composed of injured parties or a nonprofit group representing parties that had been injured by a Title IX issue. 151
Here, the members seem to postulate that the pink-hued walls somehow adversely affect the desire of females at the University of Iowa to participate in
athletics, thus creating an ability for the University to field larger male
squads.152 Even if that were the case, it would be an uphill battle for the group
to find potential female athletes, coaches, and the like who feel this way, which
is necessary to establish associational standing.153 Should Gender Justice locate

149. Puckett, supra note 69, at 275.
150. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99.
151. See id.; see, e.g., Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (U.S. App. D.C. 2004).
152. See Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 47.
153. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99.
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a group of females at the University of Iowa who are willing to say that their
desire to participate has been adversely affected by the visiting football locker
rooms, the group would still have to show that the injury was specifically traceable to the color of the walls in a room the females have never entered. Further,
the group would need to show that, by repainting the locker room walls a more
conventional color, the assembled group of females would then be more motivated to participate in athletics at the school.
Based on these analyses, the most effective way for Gender Justice—and
all others concerned with the implications raised by allowing the continuance of
pink locker rooms—to impart change may simply be to continue raising awareness regarding what they deem to be a disturbing issue. Until the time that they
can form an organization dedicated to the cause and that includes members directly injured by the issue, a day in court seems to be a non-option for the group.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy surrounding the concept of pink shaming in men’s locker
rooms has maintained traction in the media since Professor Buzuvis initially
raised the issue in 2005.154 With the continued persistence of Gender Justice, it
is not a topic that promises to disappear any time soon. However, threatening
schools with potential legal claims may not be as straight forward as the public
interest group makes it seem. This Comment does not attempt to analyze the
existence—or lack thereof—of Title IX liability for schools such as the University of Iowa that choose to maintain examples of pink shaming in their athletic
facilities. However, before the courts can examine the potential existence of a
Title IX issue, a plaintiff must first establish the requisite standing.155 The ability for Gender Justice to establish standing to bring a Title IX claim is questionable.
Despite the confusing message set forth by the circuit split within the courts,
it seems clear that, in order to bring a claim based on associational standing, a
party must be able to show that its members have been directly harmed by the
actions of another party, that the harm is traceable to the conduct that is being
challenged, and that the harm will be remedied by a sympathetic court ruling.156
Based on these requirements, it does not seem as though a non-profit group such
as Gender Justice has the means of bringing suit against the University of Iowa
or other academic institutions that choose paint their locker rooms a controversial color.157 Until such time as an individual player or coach that has been
154. See Bierman, supra note 1; Haney, supra note 1; Richmond, supra note 5.
155. Hassan v. Iowa, No. 4–11–CV–00574, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, *3–4 (S.D. Iowa 2012).
156. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99.
157. See discussion supra Part IV.
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directly affected by the color scheme at Kinnick Stadium comes forward with a
claim, the University of Iowa may maintain the rosy disposition imparted upon
the locker room by Coach Fry.

